During the heyday of Soviet rule, patterns of informal understanding, semi-legal and illegal exchange, and patronage networks were widespread in Tajikistan. In the 1970s-1980s, "the system of social relations based on the combination of the feeling of impunity, mafia-type solidarity and security from the so-called 'common people' embraced a not so narrow circle of people. It included not only obkom secretaries but academics, journalists and other intellectuals as well."(1) S.N. Eisenstadt once made a general observation for the USSR that non-institutionalised relations there "just as in most modern democratic societies" constituted "above all an addendum to the institutional centre of the society".(2) This notion was only partly true for Tajikistan with its still potent traditional society; the formalised exchange prevailed there so long as uniform institutionalised organisations executed effective social control, through coercion and meeting the basic needs of the majority of the populace.
The process of decision-making in Tajikistan, perhaps more than elsewhere in the USSR, was concealed from public view - it was essentially cryptopolitics, concentrated largely within the limits of the CPT Central Committee and its apparatus. Under Brezhnev the governing elite in Tajikistan transformed itself into a self-stabilising oligarchy which could retain its status even without resorting to blatant coercion. The overall sum of authority enjoyed by the Communist state was impressive; it effectively coped with the problems of legitimation, compliance and distribution in Tajikistan. When it came to an end in the wake of the August 1991 coup in Moscow the country slipped to the abyss of chronic instability and civil war.
Currently the role of informal exchange, traditional patronage networks and pressure groups organised along regional or purely criminal interests in political activism in Tajikistan continues to increase. Their analysis may provide us with a better understanding of the reasons for the state's failure to prescribe and enforce rules in contemporary Tajik society.
Clans and Patronage Networks
The creation of potent patron-client dyads in Tajikistan was a natural product of the peculiar character of the centre-periphery relationship in the Soviet polity. Moscow assigned local authorities specific economic tasks, which had to be met at any cost. If in the course of their implementation the prescribed standard operation modes were violated or deviated from, the centre, more likely than not, would turn a blind eye to it provided that the plans were (or appeared to be) fulfilled. And, in Gregory Gleason's words, "for local leaders to succeed in their charges, they must develop and steward the resources necessary to inspire, enthuse, mobilise, and promote within their republics. That is, they must develop political resources. To the extent that they succeed at this, they concentrate in their hands the ability to conduct politics in the traditional sense of the word, namely, to help friends and hurt enemies."(3)
In Tajikistan, informal political, parochial, kinship and criminal networks often overlapped and were inseparable from one another. The life and career of Abdumalik Abdullojonov, the Prime Minister of independent Tajikistan in 1992-1993, is especially illustrative in this sense.(4) His rise began in 1983 when he divorced his Osetian wife and married the daughter of the chief KGB officer responsible for the Nau district. The bride's mother happened to head the procurement authority of the same district. Almost immediately the hitherto inconspicuous engineer was appointed as the director of the Nau bread bakery. Connections within the KGB helped Abdullojonov shortly after: acts of embezzlement were uncovered at the bakery; he avoided jail and was even promoted to Deputy Minister of Grain Products of Tajikistan. This was the point when he started to build his own entourage. Abdullojonov pulled some of his former 'henchmen' out of prison and placed them throughout the republic. More than one furtive director of a bakery found protection from the Deputy Minister, later Minister Abdullojonov, in return for particular services. The most spectacular case involved Partov Davlatov - head of the grain procurement authority of the city of Tursunzoda. The Inspectorate of the Ministry of Finances produced a 946-page report in early 1991 in which Davlatov was accused of stealing thousands of tonnes of grain. Abdullojonov sacked the miscreant, only to reappoint him to a similar position in the capital city of Dushanbe a few months later, after destroying all the evidence. Davlatov inmediately turned the Dushanbe baking combine into his personal enterprise, where all 400 employees were either his relatives or originated from the same village.
Abdullojonov's position in the republic grew even stronger after the collapse of the Soviet Union when grain, which constitutes the basic (often the only) element of people's rations in Tajikistan, became an extremely scarce commodity and selling stolen grain on the black market became an exceptionally profitable occupation. With the absence of superior independent control authorities, it also became, in Partov Davlatov's own words, "a very easy occupation, since all leading officials in the Ministries of Grain Production and Finance and other agencies involved are actually our people."(5)
At the beginning of 1992, Abdumalik Abdullojonov's personal wealth was widely rumoured to exceed 2 billion roubles. He had loyal proteges in every corner of Tajikistan, and after becoming Prime Minister in September 1992 he worked feverishly to promote them to higher positions. Thus, Abdujalil Homidov, formerly director of the Nau bread bakery, was made Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Leninabad region; Timur Mirzoev, a distant relation of Abdullojonov, received the post of Mayor of Dushanbe; Farhod Mirpochoev, Abdullojonov's nephew, became Adviser to the Cabinet of Ministers, and so on. Much in line with the changing times, Abdullojonov was behind the creation of several private firms ("Edland", "Somoniyon", "Tojikbonkbiznes", "Timur-malik") which easily received export licences and lavish credits from the state. Even three years after Abdullojonov's dismissal so many people owe their positions and influence to him that he is seldom criticised for his deeds and still remains in the public service of his country, as Tajikistan's ambassador to Turkmenistan.
The example of Abdumalik Abdullojonov's patronage network is not very typical for Tajikistan, in the sense that it was constructed primarily along professional linkages and encompassed people of different nationalities and from different regions of Tajikistan, who could relatively easily break away after their patron's dismissal. This is exactly what happened to Abdujalil Homidov who was in hostile opposition to Abdullojonov when the latter was running for president in 1994. As a rule, patron-client webs in Tajikistan bear an imprint of kinship solidarity and are characterised by (a) less pronounced inequality and asymmetry in interaction amongst those involved; (b) life-long endurance; (c) more diffused spheres of penetration - far beyond strictly professional activities; (d) relative closeness. These hierarchal structures could be referred to as clans, for they have consonance with the attributes of a classic clan:
- common ancestry of the nucleus of the entity;
- territorial unity (the clan coincides with the local group);
- social integration inside the clan, in particular, the coopting of new members through marriage.(6)
Figure 1 depicts a coherent group of families that has featured prominently in the republic's life in the post-war period.(7)(See hard copy of theRussian and Euro-Asian Bulletin for Figure 1.) The Leninabad-Kanibodom clan has its base in the north of the republic and consists of six major families: the Arabovs (Bukhara-Leninabad), the Yaqubovs (Leninabad), the Karimovs (Kanibodom), the Asrorovs (Leninabad), the Chuliubaevs (Leninabad) and the Bobojanovs (Leninabad-Dushanbe). The Arabov family, the stem of the clan, migrated to Khujand from Bukhara late in the 19th century. While not belonging to the prestigious status groups of sayyeds, its members traced their roots to the times of Arab rule, of which their family name was an indication. Jurabek Arabov was a successful entrepreneur and land developer under the tsarist regime and in 1917 managed to transfer all his multi-million capitals to Germany. In 1925 he was executed by the OGPU, but legends about his unclaimed treasures still linger in Tajikistan.
As an old family from Bukhara, the Asrorovs enjoyed great respect and bestowed additional lustre on people connected with them. In the 1940s-1960s, Khol Yaqubov and Hilol Karimov joined them and subsequently played a significant role in expanding the power of the clan. Yaqubov was responsible for agricultural matters, sheep-breeding in particular, in the Central Committee, and Karimov was an influential member of the Tajik intelligentsia. He was the creator of the first textbooks of contemporary Tajik, and he and his relatives dominated academia in Tajikistan for decades. In a situation in which education remained a relatively rare commodity but presented a crucial element in social mobility, the ability to control admission to tertiary institutions inevitably gave certain groups within Tajikistan's prestigious elite a valuable resource to offer in exchange for favours. A sociological poll conducted amongst school-leavers in the republic in May-June 1989 yielded results that generally confirmed this postulate (Table 1 - Main Criteria for Admission to Higher Education Institutions)(See hard copy of Russian and Euro-Asian Bulletin for Tables.)
In later years Hilol Karimov's son, Jamshed Karimov, became the pivotal member of the clan. He was born in 1940, educated in Moscow and for a long time worked in the Tajik State University, where he acquired the degree of Doctor of Economics. In 1983 he was appointed the Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee of Tajikistan and in 1988 was promoted to head it, with the concomitant rank of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. In 1989-1991 Jamshed Karimov held the important position of the First Secretary of Dushanbe gorkom. In 1992 he returned to the government as First Deputy Prime Minister, in December 1994 he became Prime Minister and served in that position until February 1996. Some incumbent Cabinet members owe their posts directly to Jamshed Karimov: Shavkat Ismoilov, Minister of Justice, for one. It was Karimov's support that allowed Ismoilov to retain his portfolio during the tumultuous period in early 1995 when President Rahmonov was extremely dissatisfied with his performance. Entrepreneur Solaimon Chuliubaev and the commercial bank "Sharq" with which he is closely connected have increased their operations dramatically lately, thanks to the benevolent attitude of the Prime Minister's office.
According to information supplied by a member of one of the families in the clan, its members meet regularly to discuss house and business matters. There is no longer strict subordination to elders in the clan, but the oldest surviving Arabov - Mamadqul son of Abduqodir - always presides over all ceremonial gatherings, despite his modest position as a director of documentary films. Junior members of the clan are currently encouraged to pursue careers in such relatively new fields for Tajikistan as business and the diplomatic service. Some of them have already found employment with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and foreign missions in Dushanbe, OSCE in particular.
Almost every locality in Tajikistan can boast one or more patronage networks. They may take the form of a purely clientilistic dyad, as in Abdumalik Abdullojonov's case, or that of clans - kinship structures with primarily horizontal links and blurred obligations. They can run to the national level and beyond, but they can also be confined to a certain village or district. The point is, that all these informal organisations have always played an important role in regulating life and channelling resources within the community in Tajikistan.
Criminal Structures
Informal exchange and its most obvious form - corruption - were a tacitly recognised part of political life in Tajikistan. In 1975, A. Schelochinin, Prosecutor-General of Tajikistan, disclosed the details of a major fraud in the republic's system of consumer goods retailers, which ostensibly ran "for decades" and implicated Tajikistan's Minister of the Food Industry, a deputy Minister of Trade and 28 directors of shops and warehouses who "had developed their own standards of behaviour, their own morale and office ethics".(8) Those exposed usually received relatively mild penalties, unless Moscow directly ordered otherwise.(9) Belonging to the nomenklatura on the one hand and to a patronage network on the other was the best guarantee against imprisonment. During the period 1965-1990 only nine officials were punished for official crimes in Tajikistan (two were removed from their posts and seven were incarcerated) - the lowest figure in all five Central Asian republics.(10)
Bribery was instrumental in fulfilling economic plans. The Kommunist deplored the methods of a certain district Party committee secretary, who "intercepted fertilisers and fodder designated for others. He acquired them using bribes collected from the kolkhozes of his district".(11) There existed a fairly rational system of bribes along the following chain: director of a collective farm or industrial enterprise - raikom secretary - obkom secretary - minister or the CPT CC secretary. Eventually, it came to resemble a taxation system, since the accrued funds were spent mostly on economic development and social welfare(12). Promotions, mentions in the awards list or honorary titles were to be paid for separately. Another ingenious way of amassing shady money was based on manipulation of cotton procurement. Unlike their colleagues in Uzbekistan, officials in Tajikistan did not indulge in upward quantitative distortion. They preferred instead to decrease the fibre contents in raw cotton (from the average 34.4 percent in 1962 to 29.4 and even 18 percent in 1984), which gave them a robust additional revenue of 140 roubles per tonne gathered.(13) Given the fact that in the 1980s the annual cotton crop in Tajikistan was in the vicinity of 900,000 tonnes, there could be as much as 126 million roubles in unregistered profits from cotton sales a year (of which collective farms retained fifty percent) amounting to approximately 8 percent of the entire republican budget.(14)
Since independence, embezzlement, malversation and misappropriation of funds have become much more salient in Tajikistan. The ability to approve transactions involving cotton and aluminium is the most treasured asset for a public servant in that country today. In 1994 alone the procedure of issuing export quotas for these commodities was changed over 40(!) times(15) in order to curb illegal dealings. Obviously, it couldn't work, since that year at least 71 export contracts were made exempt from current legislation under pressure from high-placed government officials; as a result, tax revenue from cotton shipments abroad was "ridiculously small", according to the Head of Customs Committee, Khudoiqul Khamroqulov.(16)
Seventy percent of enterprises of all forms of ownership in Tajikistan successfully avoid paying taxes.(17) Whatever scant resources reach state coffers, they are prone to disappearing without trace. In August 1994, the then Chairman of National Bank Qayum Qavmiddinov failed to explain the shortage of US$ 175 million in the bank's accounts during a parliamentary hearing(18), which did not prevent him from becoming a prosperous chairman of the largest commercial bank in the republic shortly thereafter. We can only guess at the motives behind the activities of Abdujalil Samadov, Tajikistan's Prime Minister in 1993-1994, who issued US$ 300 million worth of state guarantees to private firms, thus almost doubling the country's foreign debt.
Economic misdemeanours form only part of organised crime activities that permeate the entire Tajik society nowadays. In 1990, there were 1226 recidivists in Tajikistan(19). Many of them were beginning to coalesce in gangs specialising in extortion, narcotics, gambling, etc. The number of these mafia-type entities in Tajikistan rose from 4 in 1989 to 22 in 1992, and now stands at 25-3020. Each of them "is headed by a 'brain-centre'. Under it there is a well-structured hierarchy. The groups subordinated to the centre are strictly specialised. The threads from the 'brain centre' lead upwards - to the corridors of power, and sideways - to establish intra-regional and international ties. On the whole, there is an evident trend towards penetrating the serious economy in the development of organised crime."(21) Gangsters took an active part in the political struggle in Dushanbe in 1990 and 1992; in fact, one Western analyst, describing the events of December 1992 in Tajikistan, went so far as to say that "the dividing line between political activism and criminal methods can be hazy ... The incumbent government's ousting by a combination of mob violence and political coup has led to civil war."(22)
The protracted armed conflict has grossly exacerbated the level of crime in Tajikistan. First of all, the populace has become heavily armed. In mid-1993 there were 70-75 thousand firearms at large in Tajikistan and 1305 deaths by shooting were registered that year(23), and although both figures had decreased substantially by the end of 1994, the problem continues. Second, the law-enforcement agencies have been dramatically weakened: in late 1992 - early 1993, over 300 police officers were killed in the Khatlon region alone(24). In 1993, the organs of national security had only 22 percent of their required personnel, and their archives had been all but destroyed.(25) Third, Rahmonov's government used to employ members of the disbanded People's Front of Tajikistan (PFT) in police forces en masse. Thus, quite a few shadowy figures with criminal records, starting with Yaqub Salimov, the Minister of Interior in 1992-1995, have found themselves in top positions in the law-enforcement community in Tajikistan.(26) There were cases when entire paramilitary formations of the PFT were allowed to keep their weapons. Even now, they terrorise the population of the regions where they are stationed. In 1995, all cotton-producing farms of the Kolkhozabad district in Southern Tajikistan were effectively run by field commanders with the silent support of Sherali Sabzov, the Khatlon region police chief, formerly the PFT commander himself.(27)
According to the First Deputy Minister of Interior of Tajikistan, Maj.-Gen. Blinov, "in early 1993 the criminal situation in the country was practically out of our control."(28) The regime has been trying to cope with the situation ever since, with varying degrees of success. Rahmonov's Decree No. 1 published immediately upon his election as President in November 1994 dealt with disarmament in Tajik society. He lashed out at his former PFT colleagues: "Calling themselves members of the People's Front and war heroes, and taking advantage of the confusion and ethnic hatred, some of the robbers and murderers squeezed into the ranks of the national army and police forces. They posed a threat to the security of citizens and society with their criminal activities."(29) Two subsequent thorough purges in the Ministry of Interior and the ultimate dismissal of Yaqub Salimov in August 1995 were welcomed by the people of Tajikistan. Still, this appears to be only the beginning of the process of re-establishing law and order in the country. In the meantime, the Majlisi Oli during its November 1995 session reiterated the point that "corruption, bribery, extortion and other forms of economic crime pose a serious threat to the political system of the country."(30) President Rahmonov himself has lamented that "many vital questions related to management and economic life, and even selection and appointment of personnel in some cities and districts are decided upon not by responsible officials but according to wishes and under pressure from the armed gangs."(31) At the same time, in the first eight months of 1995 all 11 criminal cases related to illegal exporting of cotton in the Khatlon region, Rahmonov's patrimony, were successfully hushed up and never reached court.(32)
The increased volume of drug-trafficking through Tajikistan - a relatively new phenomenon - is likely to give a serious boost to organised crime in the country. It is estimated that each year 100 -150 tonnes of drugs pass through Tajikistan en route to Russia and the West.(33) Local operators receive a hefty 30,000 percent profit from every kilogram of raw opium delivered to Western Europe.(34) It has been revealed recently that a number of criminal figures from Tajikistan, most notably Boris 'the Rat' Krasilovsky, have virtually monopolised control over drug trade throughout Central Asia.(35)
Regionalism
It has become fashionable to refer to the incumbent government in Tajikistan as representing one local clan(36), or as being "the regime of Communists and criminals."(37) Such interpretations, as well as portrayal of the conflict in that country as a clash between Islamists and secularists, democrats and totalitarian forces or a conspiracy of foreign powers serve only to obscure the fact that the irreconcilable contradictions amongst different sub-ethnic groups within the failed 'Tajik Socialist nation' form the main cleavages in contemporary Tajik society and, consequently, the political process should be viewed through the prism of the competition between distinctive historical, cultural and economic regions in Tajikistan.
The analysis of regionalism, an intrinsically interesting subject in itself, lies beyond the scope of this article. It would be reasonable to assume, however, that unofficial units of political socialisation, such as clans, patronage networks and criminal structures are related to autonomous power centres in the regions. Actually, they act as the means to vociferate and carry out the interests of particular regions. They are not that conspicuous when official structures implement and defend local policies vis-a-vis authorities in Dushanbe efficiently, as has been the case in the Leninabad region. On the other hand, when local soviets failed to guarantee security and livelihood of the people in Kulyab and Qurghonteppa in 1992, Sangak Safarov and his 'boys' from the PFT came to the fore. Generally speaking, leaders of legal power structures and informal groups in any given region form a more or less cohesive clique which selects its own modus operandi depending on the current situation.
At present the central government apparatus, especially the coercive organs, are controlled by the regional clique from Kulyab. It represents a major deviation from the routine established under Soviet rule whereby people from the North dominated the political scene of Tajikistan (Table 2 - Regional Composition of Decision-Making Bodies in Tajikistan)(See hard copy of the Russian and Euro-Asian Bulletin for Tables).
Regional elites treat the rise of Kulyabis with suspicion and demand a greater share of power for themselves, not necessarily using constitutional methods to attain their goals, to which recent uprisings in Qurghonteppa, Hissor and Khojand bear witness.(38) President Rahmonov, as a political observer close to the Tajik opposition has noted, "tries hard to emulate the Khojandis in distributing power evenly amongst the regions, retaining its dominance at the same time. This policy fails because it can't reach the high level of Khojandi diplomacy. The people from different regions whom they have appointed to high government positions in order to exert control over the populace of those regions not only lack authority and serious influence in their homelands, but, moreover, in most cases local people treat them with overt hatred and disdain."(39)
The latest personnel shifts in Tajikistan show that Rahmonov is attempting to split the Leninabadi regional clique by promoting people from minor clans there. The group headed by veteran politician Salohiddin Hasanov, currently chairman of the city of Uroteppa, which includes Amirqul Azimov, Tajikistan's Prosecutor-General, Tuigun Karimov, Deputy Chairman of the CPT, Habibullo Saidmurodov, Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences, and Guljahon Bobosadykova, Tajikistan's representative in UNESCO, is one such example.
It is noteworthy that Rahmonov not only pardoned Ibodullo Boimatov, the leader of the February 1996 riot in Tursunzoda, but appointed him Tajikistan's trade representative in Uzbekistan. Boimatov is a close associate of Jamoliddin Mansurov, the Deputy Prime-Minister of Tajikistan and the charismatic leader of the region of Hissor who, in his turn, in 1992 enjoyed the support of a certain Salimboy-bacha - the criminal godfather of neighbouring Uzbekistan and a crony of the then Vice-President of Uzbekistan Shukrullo Mirsaidov.(40)
In summary, institutions based on traditional and illegal exchange continue to play a prominent role in today's Tajikistan. So long as the central government fails to transcend its policy of patrimonialism and acts with the sole goal of survival, these alternative structures will be in a position to prescribe their rules of behaviour on society. Rahmonov's regime has been moving, albeit slowly, towards greater legitimacy, stability and institutionalisation, but further setbacks to this process may well occur, and the prospect of the resumption of chaos and violence in Tajikistan still remains viable.
Endnotes:
1 A. Bystritsky, D. Shusharin. "Ten' Brezhneva menia usynovila." Literaturnaia Gazeta, 30 March 1994, p. 11.
2 S.N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger. Patrons, Clients and Friends. Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1984, p. 50.
3 Gregory Gleason. Federalism and Nationalism. The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR. Westview Press: Boulder, 1990, p. 96.
4 Details of Mr Abdullojonov's biography have been collected during a number of interviews in Dushanbe and Khojand in February-April 1995, and also derive from an extensive article in Sadoi Mardum (11 June 1994) as well as from a recent book by a well-known Tajik politician (Hikmatullo Nasriddinov. Tarkish. Afsona: Dushanbe, 1995, pp. 236-286).
5 Hikmatullo Nasriddinov. Tarkish. Afsona: Dushanbe, 1995, p. 247.
6 Adapted from: N.A. Butinov. "Obschina, sem'ia, rod." Sovetskaia Etnografiia, No. 2, 1968, p. 91.
7 Data for the genealogical scheme was collected during fieldwork in Tajikistan in 1994-1995. The author would like to express gratitude to M.A. Arabov - the oldest surviving son of Abduqodir Arabov, who made invaluable comments and alterations to it.
8 Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 5 April 1975.
9 Another interesting case occurred in 1961, when a group of high-ranking officials in Dushanbe was caught red-handed embezzling public funds to build private homes (one of the accused was Mahmud Ismoilov, then Chairman of the Juridical Commission of the Council of Ministers). It took one year, three articles in the central Izvestiia newspaper and intervention on the part of the CPSU CC to induce the Tajik leadership to take any serious action in this regard. (The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XIV, No. 16, 1962, p. 28; Vol. XIV, No. 24, 1962, p. 24.)
10 William A. Clark. "Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom, 1965-1990." Europa-Asia Studies,, Vol. 45, No. 2, 1993, p. 269.
11 G. Zimanas. "Mestnichestvo - vredny perezhitok." Kommunist, No. 2, 1963, p. 78.
12 In the Kolkhozabad district a raikom secretary used to require chairmen of 13 collective farms to contribute 5,000 roubles a year to the 'slush fund' in order to organise summer camps for children, build kindergartens, etc. (Taped interview with Ms Mo'azza Osmanova - Deputy Head of Kolkhozabad hukumat (district administration), 27 March 1995).
13 Vasily Seliunin. "Bremia deistvii." Perestroika, Vol. 5, Sovetskii pisatel: Moscow, 1990, p. 186.
14 Calculations are based on: Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 6 December 1985.
15 Narodnaia gazeta, 5 November 1994.
16 Biznes i politika, No. 3 (109), January 1995.
17 Emomali Rahmonov. Tojikiston: chahor soli istiqloliyyat va khudshinosi. Irfon: Dushanbe, 1995, p. 107.
18 Izvestiia, 4 August 1994.
19 Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 5 April 1991.
20 Data disclosed by Dr Rahmatillo Zoirov during a seminar at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 14 February 1995.
21 Komsomolskaia pravda, 5 April 1994.
22 Mark Galeotti. "Red Mafias and National Security." Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 5, No. 1, January 1993, p. 22.
23 Interview with Gen. Yaqubjon Salimov, Minister of the Interior of Tajikistan, broadcast on Dushanbe TV, in Tajik, 8.50 PM, 10 February 1995.
24 Biznes i politika, No. 6 (112), February 1995.
25 Biznes i politika, No. 14 (120), April 1995.
26 Charoghi ruz (No. 1 (79) 1995) published a list of 44 ex-criminals and PFT field commanders who had been assigned to prominent positions in Tajikistan's police.
27 Confidential source in the Kolkhozabad district administration.
28 Segodnia, 2 September 1994.
29 Narodnaia gazeta, 19 October 1994.
30 Biznes i politika, No. 46 (152), November 1995.
31 Narodnaia gazeta, 28 January 1995.
32 Narodnaia gazeta, 3 November 1995.
33 Pravda, 5 January 1995.
34 Argumenty i fakty, No. 4 (745), January 1995, p. 7.
35 Segodnia, 6 July 1995.
36 Segodnia, 13 July 1995.
37 Avstraliiskoe ekho, 10 June 1996.
38 "Tajikistan: Dissident Warlords Make Peace with Government." Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 7 February 1996, Vol. II; "Tajik Government Pressed on Three Fronts." Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 1 July 1996, Vol. II
39 Daily Digest of TV and Radio Broadcasts, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan, 12 December 1994, p. 3.
40 Sharaf Khoja. "Uzbekistan: Friendship Gains Victory in Government's Struggle against Corruption." Russia and the Moslem World, No. 10. 1994, p. 43.